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Abstract
Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly,
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1 Introduction
No-regret strategies are simple adaptive learning rules that recently received a lot of
attention in the literature.1 In a repeated game, a player has a regret for an action if,
loosely speaking, she could have obtained a greater average payoff had she played that
action more often in the past. In the course of the game, the player reinforces actions
that she regrets not having played enough, for instance, by choosing next action with
probability proportional to the regret for that action, as in Hart and Mas-Colell’s [26]
regret matching rule. Existence of no-regret strategies (i.e., strategies that guarantee no
regrets almost surely in the long run) is known since Hannan [25]; wide classes of no-regret
strategies are identified by Hart and Mas-Colell [27] and Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [13].2
A no-regret dynamics is a stochastic process that describes trajectories of the average
correlated play of players and that emerges when every player follows a no-regret strategy
(different players may play different strategies). By definition, it converges to the Hannan
set (the set of all correlated actions that satisfy the no-regret condition first stated by
Hannan [25]).3 This set is typically large. It contains the set of correlated equilibria of the
game and we show that it may even contain correlated actions that put positive weight
only on strictly dominated actions. Thus convergence of the average play to the Hannan
set often provides very little information about what the players will actually play, as it
does not even imply exclusion of strictly dominated actions.
In this paper we show that no-regret dynamics are intimately linked to the classical
fictitious play process [11]. Drawing on Monderer et al. [42], we first show that contrary
to the standard, discrete-time version, continuous fictitious play leads to no regret. We
then show that, for a large class of no-regret dynamics, if a player’s maximal regret is
ε > 0, then she plays an ε-best reply to the average correlated play of the others. Since in
this class the maximal regret vanishes (see Corollary 1 below), it follows that, for a good
choice of behavior when all regrets are negative, the dynamics is a vanishingly perturbed
version of fictitious play.
1These rules have been used to investigate convergence to equilibria in the context of learning in games
[21, 22, 26, 27, 28], for combining different forecasts [19, 20] (for an overview of the forecast combination
literature see [16, 47]) and for combining opinions, which is also of interest to management science [37].
In finance this method has been used to derive bounds on the prices of financial instruments [15, 17].
This method can be applied to various tasks in computer science, such as job scheduling [40] and routing
[10] (for a survey of applicable problems in computer science see [35]).
2This paper deals with the simplest notion of regret known as unconditional (or external) regret
[22, 27, 28]. For more sophisticated regret notions, see Hart and Mas-Colell [26], Lehrer [38], and Cesa-
Bianchi and Lugosi [14].
3The Hannan set of a game is also known as the set of weak correlated equilibria [43] or coarse correlated
equilibria [52, Ch.3].
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For two-player finite games, this observation and the theory of perturbed differential
inclusions [5, 6] allow us to relate formally the asymptotic behavior of no-regret dynamics
and of continuous fictitious play (or its time-rescaled version, the best-reply dynamics
[24]). In classes of games in which the behavior of continuous fictitious play is well known,
this provides substantial information on the asymptotic behavior of no-regret dynamics.
In particular, we recover most known convergence properties of no-regret dynamics. Our
results do not just allow us to find new and sometimes much shorter proofs of convergence
of no-regret dynamics towards the set of Nash equilibria in some classes of games, such as
dominance solvable game or potential games. They also allow us to relate the asymptotic
behavior of no-regret dynamics and continuous fictitious play in case of divergence, as in
the famous Shapley game [45].
These results extend only partially to n-player games (though they fully extend to
n-player games with linear incentives [44]). The issue is that in n-player games no-regret
dynamics turn out to be related to the correlated version of continuous fictitious play, in
which the players play a best-reply to the correlated past play of the others. This version
of fictitious play is defined through a correspondence which is not convex valued. This
creates technical difficulties, because the theory of perturbed differential inclusions is not
developed for non convex valued correspondences.
A different way to analyze no-regret dynamics is to show that some sets attract nearby
solution trajectories. We show that strict Nash equilibria and, more generally, the inter-
section of the Hannan set and the sets that are closed under rational behavior (curb)4 are
attracting for no-regret dynamics, in a sense to be defined in Section 4.
The remainder of the note is organized as follows. The next section introduces no-
regret dynamics. Section 3 studies the links between no-regret dynamics and fictitious
play. Section 4 shows that the intersection of the Hannan set and curb sets is attracting
for no-regret dynamics. Section 5 studies the continuous-time version and the expected
version of no-regret dynamics. Finally, the Appendix contains the proofs of the main
results, as well as counterexamples illustrating the complexity of the relationship between
ICT and limit sets.
4A product set of action profiles is called closed under rational behavior (curb) [3] if it contains all
best replies of each player whenever she believes that no actions outside this set are being played by the
other players.
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2 Preliminaries
Consider a bimatrix game Γ = (Ai, ui)i=1,2, where Ai is the set of actions of player
i and ui : A → R is her payoff function, with A = A1 × A2. For any finite set
B, denote by ∆(B) the set of probability distributions over B. A mixed action of
player i is an element of ∆(Ai). A correlated action z is a probability distribution
over the set of pure action profiles, i.e., z ∈ ∆(A). Given such a z, let zi ∈ ∆(Ai)
and z−i ∈ ∆(A−i) denote its marginals for player i and her opponent, respectively.
Thus, zi(ai) =
∑
a−i∈A−i z(ai, a−i). Throughout, −i refers to i’s opponent. As usual,
let ui(z) =
∑
a∈A z(a)ui(a) and ui(k, z−i) =
∑
a−i∈A−i z−i(a−i)ui(k, a−i) for k ∈ Ai. De-
pending on the context, ai may refer to a pure action – an element of Ai – or to a vertex
of ∆(Ai), i.e., a Dirac measure on a pure action.
The game is played repeatedly in discrete time periods t ∈ N∗ = {1, 2, . . .}. In every
period t each player i chooses an action ai(t) ∈ Ai and receives payoff ui(a(t)) where
a(t) = (a1(t), a2(t)). Denote by h(t) = (a(1), a(2), . . . , a(t)) the history of play up to t,
and let H be the set of all finite histories (including the empty history). A strategy of
player i is a function qi : H → ∆(Ai) that stipulates to play in every period t = 1, 2, . . .
a mixed action qi(t) ≡ qi(h(t− 1)) as a function of the history before t. The weight that
this mixed action puts on action k ∈ Ai is denoted by qi,k(t)
The average correlated play up to period t is z(t) = 1
t
∑t
τ=1 a(τ), where we identify
a(τ) with the corresponding vertex of ∆(A). Since z(t) = 1
t
[a(t) + (t− 1)z(t− 1)], it
follows that for all t > 1,
z(t)− z(t− 1) = 1
t
(a(t)− z(t− 1)) . (1)
For a correlated action z, the regret of player i for action k is defined as Ri,k(z) =
ui(k, z−i) − ui(z), and her maximal regret as Ri,max(z) = maxk∈Ai Ri,k(z). Typically we
deal with the regret based on the average correlated play, z(t), up to some period t. In this
case the regret of player i for action k ∈ Ai is equal to the difference between the average
payoff she would have obtained by always playing k (assuming that her opponent’s play
remains the same) and her average realized payoff:
Ri,k(z(t)) = ui(k, z−i(t))− ui(z(t)) = 1
t
t∑
τ=1
[ui(k, a−i(τ))− ui(a(τ))].
To simplify notations, we will often write Ri,k(t) forRi,k(z(t)) andRi,max(t) forRi,max(z(t)).
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Player i has no asymptotic regret if her average realized payoff is asymptotically no
less than her best-reply payoff against the empirical distribution of her opponent:
lim sup
t→∞
Ri,max(t) ≤ 0. (2)
A strategy of player i is a no-regret strategy if for any strategy of the other player, in-
equality (2) holds almost surely. This property is also called Hannan consistency [27] or
universal consistency [22].
It is well known in the literature since Hannan [25] that there exist simple no-regret
strategies. Hart and Mas-Colell [27] describe a wide class of potential based no-regret
strategies. A twice differentiable, convex function Pi : R
Ai → R is called a potential if it
satisfies the following conditions:
(R1) Pi(·) ≥ 0, and Pi(x) = 0 for all x ∈ RAi− ;
(R2) ∇Pi(·) ≥ 0, and ∇Pi(x) · x > 0 for all x /∈ RAi− ;
(R3) if x /∈ RAi− and xk ≤ 0, then ∇kPi(x) = 0,
where ∇k denotes the partial derivative with respect to xi(k). The potential Pi can be
viewed as a generalized distance function between a vector x ∈ RAi and the nonpositive
orthant RAi− . Let Ri(t) = (Ri,k(t))k∈Ai denote player i’s regret vector.
Proposition 1. Let Pi satisfy (R1)–(R3) and let strategy qi satisfy
qi,k(t+ 1) =
∇kPi(Ri(t))∑
s∈Ai ∇sPi(Ri(t))
, ∀k ∈ Ai, (Q1)
whenever Ri,max(t) > 0. Then qi is a no-regret strategy.
Proof. This holds by Theorem 3.3 of Hart and Mas-Colell [27], whose conditions (R1)
and (R2) are satisfied by our conditions (R1)–(Q1) and (R2), respectively, and whose
proof is based on the Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem [9].
A standard example of no-regret strategy satisfying the above conditions is obtained
by letting Pi be the lp-norm on R
Ai
+ , i.e. Pi(x) = (
∑
k∈Ai[xk]
p
+)
1/p with 1 < p <∞, where
[xk]+ = max(0, xk). The resulting strategy qi is called the lp-norm strategy [13, 27]. It is
defined by
qi,k(t+ 1) =
[Ri,k(t)]
p−1
+∑
s∈Ai[Ri,s(t)]
p−1
+
, ∀k ∈ Ai,
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whenever Ri,max(t) > 0. The l2-norm strategy is the regret-matching strategy [26], that
stipulates to play an action in the next period with probability proportional to the regret
for that action. For large p, the lp-norm strategies approximate fictitious play.
We say that the average correlated play z(t) follows a no-regret dynamics if both
players use (possibly different) no-regret strategies. A trajectory (z(t))1≤t≤+∞ of a no-
regret dynamics is thus a solution of (1) where a(t) is a realization of (q1(t), q2(t)) and
q1, q2 are no-regret strategies. We focus on the class R of no-regret dynamics such that:
(i) the no-regret strategies q1, q2 of the players are potential-based: they satisfy (Q1)
for some potentials P1, P2 satisfying (R1)-(R3);
(ii) if a player has no-regret then he takes some constant pure action: for each i = 1, 2,
there exists c ∈ Ai such that
ai(t+ 1) = c whenever Ri,max(t) ≤ 0. (Q2)
Our results are valid for a somewhat wider class of no-regret dynamics. What we really
need, beside a no-regret dynamics, is that from some period t0 on:
(i′) if a player has positive regret for some actions, then she plays one of these actions.
(ii′) if a player never has any positive regret, then she plays an ε(t)-best reply to the
empirical distribution of her opponent, where ε(t) = ε(h(t))→ 0 almost surely.
Remark 1. Property (i′) follows from (R3) and (Q1). This is a better reply property that
stipulates to assign a positive probability only on better reply actions to the opponent’s
empirical distribution of play (“better” with respect to the realized payoff). Also it implies
that if Ri,max(t) > 0 in some period t, then Ri,max(t
′) > 0 for all t′ > t. Indeed, when
an action k with positive regret is played, the sign of Ri,k(t) does not change, hence the
maximal regret remains positive [27, Proposition 4.3].
Remark 2. Assumption (Q2) is a simple way of ensuring (ii′), and in addition, that
if Ri,max(t) ≤ 0 for all t, then Ri,max(t) → 0 as t → +∞.5 Indeed, if Ri,max(t) ≤ 0
for all t > t0 then by (Q2), for all t > t0, tRi,c(t) = t0Ri,c(t0), hence Ri,c(t) → 0. It
follows that Ri,max(t) → 0 and that for all t > t0, player i plays an ε(t)-best reply with
ε(t) := maxk∈Ai ui(k, z−i(t))− ui(c, z−i(t)) = Ri,max(t) − Ri,c(t) → 0. For a discussion of
other possible assumptions, see Hart and Mas-Colell [28], Appendix A.
Note that there are no-regret dynamics that do not satisfy (i′). For instance, stochastic
fictitious play with a noise parameter that declines with time at an appropriate rate (see,
5This additional property is needed for Corollary 1 below, but for our main results (ii′) suffices.
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e.g., Bena¨ım and Faure [4]). This process is not potential based in our sense due to the
time inhomogeneity, but this is not the crucial point, since (i′)-(ii′) would suffice.
Define the Hannan set H of the stage game Γ as the set of all correlated actions of
the players where each player has no regret:
H =
{
z ∈ ∆(A)
∣∣∣∣maxk∈Ai ui(k, z−i) ≤ ui(z) for each i = 1, 2
}
.
The reduced Hannan set HR is the subset of H in which at least one regret is exactly zero
for each player:
HR =
{
z ∈ ∆(A)
∣∣∣∣maxk∈Ai ui(k, z−i) = ui(z) for each i = 1, 2
}
.
The next property of no-regret dynamics is straightforward by the definition of no-
regret strategies and Remark 2 (see, e.g., Hart and Mas-Colell [28, Corollary 3.2]).
Corollary 1. For every no-regret dynamics in class R, the trajectories converge almost
surely to the reduced Hannan set.
Convergence of the average play z(t) to set HR does not imply its convergence to any
particular point in HR. Moreover, even if z(t) converges to a point, this point need not
be a Nash equilibrium.
3 Fictitious play and no-regret dynamics
3.1 Fictitious play
In discrete fictitious play, in every period t after the initial one, player i plays a pure best
reply ai(t) to the average past play of her opponent x−i(t − 1) := 1t−1
∑t−1
τ=1 a−i(τ) (here
a−i(τ) is a vertex of ∆(A−i)). The latter is called the belief of player i on her opponent’s
next move. Formally, for any x = (x1, x2) in ∆(A1)×∆(A2), denote by BRi(x−i) player
i’s set of best replies to x−i:
BRi(x−i) :=
{
xi ∈ ∆(Ai)
∣∣∣ui(xi, x−i) = max
k∈Ai
ui(k, x−i)
}
, i = 1, 2.
Let BR(x) = BR1(x2)×BR2(x1). A discrete-time trajectory (x(t))∞t=1 on ∆(A1)×∆(A2)
is a solution of discrete fictitious play (DFP) if for every t > 1
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x(t)− x(t− 1) = 1
t
(a(t)− x(t− 1)) (3)
where a(t) = (a1(t), a2(t)) and ai(t) ∈ BRi(x−i(t − 1)) is a vertex of ∆(Ai) associated
with some pure best reply action, i = 1, 2.
Analogously, an absolutely continuous function x : [1,∞) → ∆(A1) × ∆(A2) is a
solution of continuous fictitious play (CFP) if for almost all t ≥ 1, x(t) is differentiable
and
x˙(t) =
1
t
(q(t)− x(t)) ,
where q(t) ∈ BR(x(t)) is now a profile of mixed actions. This may be written as the
differential inclusion:
x˙(t) ∈ 1
t
(BR(x(t))− x(t)) . (4)
The average correlated play satisfies z(t) := 1
t
(
z(1) +
∫ t
1
q(τ)dτ
)
for some initial condition
z(1) such that zi(1) = xi(1), i = 1, 2. Thus, for almost all t, z(t) is differentiable and
z˙(t) =
1
t
(q¯(t)− z(t)), (5)
where q¯ = q1⊗q2 ∈ ∆(A) is the product distribution corresponding to the mixed strategy
profile q = (q1, q2) ∈ ∆(A1)×∆(A2), and qi is a best-reply to z−i.6
In discrete or continuous fictitious play, the marginals z1(t), z2(t) of the average past
play are equal to the beliefs x1(t), x2(t). By analogy, if z(t) is the average past play
generated by a no-regret dynamics, it is convenient to call z−i(t) the belief of player i
about her opponent’s next move. This illuminates a crucial difference between fictitious
play and no-regret dynamics in class R: under fictitious play, a player chooses a best reply
to her belief, whereas under no-regret dynamics, she chooses a better reply (“better” with
respect to her average realized payoff).
6This definition of CFP guarantees that solutions exist in all games and for all initial conditions,
and that by the change of time scale y(t) = x(et), CFP corresponds to the best-reply dynamics [24, 41]
defined by y˙ ∈ BR(y) − y. Another definition of CFP (e.g., Monderer et al. [42, p. 445] and Berger [8,
pp. 252–253]) consider only trajectories that are piecewise linear, such that qi(t) is always a pure action
(technically, a vertex of ∆(Ai)), and that the times at which q(t) changes have no finite accumulation
point. This restricted definition is easier to handle, but in many games there do not exist such trajectories
from every initial condition.
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3.2 Continuous fictitious play leads to no regret
It is well known that discrete fictitious play does not lead to no regret [27, 51]. Consider
the following example:
L R
L 1,
√
2 0, 0
R 0, 0
√
2, 1
Fig. 1
Because
√
2 is irrational, L and R cannot both be best-replies to the empirical past play of
the other player. Thus, any DFP process is entirely determined by its first move. Assume
that the first move is off the diagonal, say (L,R). Due to the symmetry of the game and
the absence of ties, both players always switch to another action simultaneously. Therefore
the play is locked off the diagonal and the maximal regret is at least
√
2/(1 +
√
2) at any
stage. This holds in the mixed extension of the game, since at any stage the players have
a unique, pure best reply.
Since the continuous fictitious play process is a continuous-time version of DFP, intu-
itively, it should not lead to no regret either. The following result — a generalization of
Theorem D of Monderer et al. [42] — shows that this intuition is misleading.
Proposition 2. Under any solution of continuous fictitious play, the average correlated
play converges to the reduced Hannan set.
This discrepancy between DFP and CFP may be explained as follows. Playing an
action with positive regret decreases the regret for this action. In CFP, roughly, when an
action is played it remains a best reply, hence it is associated with maximal regret for a
small time increment. Precisely, the derivative of the regret for the action played is equal
to the derivative of the maximal regret. Since the regret for this action decreases, so does
the maximal regret. In contrast, in DFP, an action played at stage t has maximal regret
at stage t, but not necessarily at stage t+ 1. Thus the fact that the regret for this action
decreases does not entail that the maximal regret does.
Proof of Proposition 2. For comparison with Hart and Mas-Colell [28, Theorem
3.1], rescale time (let t˜ = exp t) so that (5) becomes z˙ = q¯ − z. For any mixed action
σi ∈ ∆(Ai), let
Ri,σi(t) :=
∑
k∈Ai
σi(k)Ri,k(t) = ui(σi, z−i(t))− ui(z(t))
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Let vi(t) = Ri,max(t). Note that Ri,k is Lipschitz continuous for all k in Ai. Thus it follows
from Theorem A.4 of Hofbauer and Sandholm [30] that, for almost all t, vi and Ri,k are
differentiable, and for all k such that qi,k(t) > 0, we have v˙i(t) = R˙i,k(t). It follows that
v˙i =
∑
k qi,kR˙i,k = R˙i,qi. Furthermore:
R˙i,qi = ui(qi, z˙−i)−ui(z˙) = ui(qi, q−i−z−i)−ui(q¯−z) = −[ui(qi, z−i)−ui(z)] = −Ri,qi = −vi.
Thus, v˙i = −vi. Therefore, vi(t) converges to zero for all i = 1, 2, hence z(t)→ Hr.
Remark 3. In the proof, we did not use that q−i is a best-reply to zi. This shows
that the fact that CFP leads to no-regret is a unilateral property. That is, if a player’s
behavior evolves according to CFP, then she has no asymptotic regret, independently of
her opponent’s behavior (see also Monderer et al. [42, p. 445]).
Remark 4. CFP and the best-reply dynamics converge to the set of Nash equilibria in
finite zero-sum games [32]. The usual proof is to show that the “duality gap” W (x) =
maxk∈A1 u1(k, x2)−mins∈A2 u1(x1, s) converges to zero. This follows from the above proof,
since in a two-player zero sum game W (x(t)) = R1,max(z(t)) + R2,max(z(t)), where x is a
solution of CFP and z the associated correlated play.
3.3 No-regret dynamics is perturbed CFP
In the previous subsection we showed that CFP leads to no regret. Conversely, we now
show that any no-regret dynamics in class R (as defined in Section 2) is closely related
to CFP. We first explain the intuition. Denote by BRεi (x−i) the set of ε-best replies of
player i to the mixed action x−i of her opponent:
BRεi (x−i) =
{
xi ∈ ∆(Ai)
∣∣∣ ui(xi, x−i) ≥ max
k∈Ai
ui(k, x−i)− ε
}
, i = 1, 2.
The crucial observation is the following.
Lemma 1. Assume that the maximal regret is less than ε. Then any action with positive
regret is an ε-best reply to the average play of the opponent.
Proof. If player i has positive regret for action ai at some z ∈ ∆(A), then ui(z) −
ui(ai, z−i) < 0. But by assumption maxk∈Ai ui(k, z−i) − ui(z) ≤ ε. Therefore, maxk∈Ai
ui(k, z−i)− ui(ai, z−i) < ε, and ai is an ε-best reply to z−i.
Since no-regret dynamics in class R only pick actions with positive regret, they only
pick ε-best replies to the average play of the others, where ε is the maximal regret.
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Since this maximal regret approaches zero almost surely, eventually only almost-exact
best replies are picked. This provides the intuition why no-regret dynamics and fictitious
play may exhibit similar asymptotic behavior. Finding a precise link, however, is not
obvious. For instance, there could exist actions that are εt-best replies in each period t,
with εt → 0, but never exact best replies. Thus a limit play of no-regret dynamics may
include such actions, but this cannot happen under fictitious play.
L R
L 1, 0 0,
√
2
R 0, 1
√
2, 0
C η, 0 η, 0
Fig. 2
Consider the example shown on Fig. 2. Let η =
√
2/(1+
√
2). It is easy to verify that
action C is player 1’s best reply to player 2’s mixed action x2 if and only if x2 = (η, 1−η).
Let us first consider DFP. Since η is an irrational number, after every finite history of
play, C 6∈ BR1(x2(t)); consequently DFP never picks C (except, possibly, at the initial
period).7 However, it may be shown that under any DFP trajectory, the average play
x2(t) of player 2 converges to (η, 1 − η), to which C is a best-reply. It follows that C is
an εt-best reply to x2(t) for some sequence εt → 0. Thus a no-regret dynamics with the
same trajectory of the marginal play of player 2 might choose action C a positive fraction
of time in the long run.
This example does not apply to CFP, as in this case x2(t) need not be a rational
number; and as we show below, the asymptotic behavior of no-regret dynamics and CFP
can be formally related using the theory of perturbed differential inclusions [5, 6].
Before stating a precise result, we need some definitions. A set L ⊂ ∆(A1)×∆(A2) is
invariant under CFP if for every initial point x ∈ L there exists a solution x(·) of CFP,
defined for all t > 0 (not only t ≥ 1) and such that x(1) = x and x(t) ∈ L for all t > 0.
A nonempty compact invariant set is an attractor if it attracts uniformly all trajectories
starting in its neighborhood. An invariant set L is attractor-free if no proper subset of L
is an attractor for the dynamics restricted to L. A nonempty compact set L is internally
chain transitive (ICT) for continuous fictitious play if every pair of points in L can be
connected by finitely many arbitrarily long pieces of orbits of CFP lying completely within
7Starting with an arbitrary belief x2(1) would not help since C is a best-reply only when x2(t) =
(η, 1− η), which happens at most once.
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L with arbitrarily small jumps between them.8 Every ICT set is invariant and attractor
free [6, Property 2]. The limit set of the beliefs of a trajectory z(t) on ∆(A1 × A2) is the
set of all accumulation points of its marginals (z1(t), z2(t)) ∈ ∆(A1)×∆(A2) as t→∞.
Theorem 1. For every no-regret dynamics in class R, the limit set of the beliefs is almost
surely internally chain transitive for continuous fictitious play.9
We give here a sketch of the proof. The details are given in Appendix A.1. A discrete-
time trajectory (x1(t), x2(t))
∞
t=1 on ∆(A1) × ∆(A2) is a payoff perturbed DFP trajectory
if there exists a positive sequence (εt) converging to zero such that (3) holds and ai(t) is
a vertex of ∆(Ai) associated with a pure εt-best reply to x−i(t − 1), for all i = 1, 2 and
all t > 1. A no-regret dynamics in class R generates a trajectory (z(t))∞t=1 on ∆(A) and
an associated sequence of beliefs (z1(t), z2(t)) on ∆(A1)×∆(A2). Building on Lemma 1,
we show that this sequence of beliefs is almost surely a payoff perturbed DFP trajectory.
By an auxiliary lemma, this implies that this is almost surely a graph-perturbed DFP
trajectory: a notion similar to payoff-perturbed trajectory, but for another definition of
perturbed best-reply, the one used in the theory of perturbed differential inclusions [5, 6].
It follows that the continuous-time interpolation of this sequence of beliefs is almost surely
a perturbed solution of CFP, in the sense of Bena¨ım et al. [5]. Theorem 1 then follows
from Theorem 3.6 of Bena¨ım et al. [5].
Since ICT sets are invariant, a consequence of Theorem 1 is the following:
Corollary 2. Let A be the global attractor of CFP (i.e., its maximal invariant set, see
Bena¨ım et al. [5]). For any no-regret dynamics in class R, the limit set of the beliefs is
almost surely a subset of A.
Note the similarity with Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 of Hofbauer et al. [33], who study
the links between the time-average of the replicator dynamics and CFP.
3.4 Applications of Theorem 1 and comments.
Theorem 1 allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of most known
convergence properties of no-regret dynamics. Below, we write that no-regret dynamics
8For the formal definitions of attractor and attractor-free set see Bena¨ım et al. [6, p. 675]; for the
definition of ICT see Bena¨ım et al. [5, p. 337]. Note that the definition of invariance in Bena¨ım et al.
[5, 6] applies to the best-reply dynamics, so an appropriate time rescaling must be used to apply it to
CFP (see footnote 6). This explains that their definition considers solutions defined for all t ∈ R while
ours considers solutions defined for all t > 0.
9In the statement of Theorem 1, CFP can be replaced by the best-reply dynamics since they clearly
have the same ICT sets (see footnote 6).
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converge to some set E if the limit set of the beliefs is almost surely a subset of E.10
(a) For any game which is best-reply equivalent to a two-person zero sum game, the global
attractor of CFP is the set of Nash equilibria [32]. Hence all no-regret dynamics in class
R converge to the set of Nash equilibria. Actually, in zero-sum games, if the correlated
action z is in the Hannan set (recall that this is the set of correlated actions that satisfy
no-regret for all players), then (z1, z2) is a Nash equilibrium. Consequently, in zero-sum
games all dynamics that lead to no regret (not only those in class R) converge to the
set of Nash equilibria. This holds more generally for stable bimatrix games [30], because
these are rescaled zero-sum games in the sense of Hofbauer and Sigmund [31], as is easily
shown and was known to Josef Hofbauer (private communication).
(b) For games with strictly dominated strategies, the global attractor of CFP is contained
in the face of the simplex with no weight on these strategies. Hence all no-regret dynamics
in class R converge to this face. Similarly, these dynamics converge to the unique Nash
equilibrium in strictly dominance solvable games.
A B C
A 2 1 −4
B 1 0 −1
C −4 −1 −2
A A− B B−
A 1 1 0 0
A− 1− ε 1− ε −ε −ε
B 0 0 1 1
B− −ε −ε 1− ε 1− ε
(i) (ii)
Fig. 3
Contrary to (a), this need not be true for all dynamics that lead to no regret. Indeed,
convergence to the Hannan set or even to the reduced Hannan set does not guarantee
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Consider, for instance, the games shown on
Fig. 3. Both games are symmetric, so we indicate only the payoffs of the row player. Game
(i) is an identical interest game which is strictly dominance solvable; yet the correlated
action putting probabilities 1/3 on each diagonal square is in the reduced Hannan set.
For ε = 0, game (ii) is a coordination game with duplicate strategies. For ε > 0, the
duplicates A−, B− are penalized and become strictly dominated. Thus, the correlated
action putting probability 1/2 on (A−, A−) and 1/2 on (B−, B−) puts only weight on
strictly dominated actions. Yet, for ε ≤ 1/2, it belongs to the Hannan set.11
10Note that some applications of Theorem 1 (points (a), (b) and (c) below) lead to the same conclu-
sions about no-regret dynamics as those about the time average of the replicator dynamics described in
Hofbauer et al. [33, p. 267, points (2), (3) and (4)].
11See also the game of Moulin and Vial [43, p. 205], where the third strategy of player 1 is strictly
13
(c) In weighted potential games, all internally chain transitive sets of CFP are (subsets
of) connected components of Nash equilibria on which the payoffs are constant [see 5,
Theorem 5.5 and Remark 5.6]. Hence by Theorem 1, all no-regret dynamics in class R
converge to such components. Note that the original proof is much longer [28, Appendix
A].
(d) If the beliefs (z1(t), z2(t)) of a no-regret dynamics converge to the set of Nash equi-
libria, then the average realized payoff converges to the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs.
To see why this is true, let zˆ ∈ ∆(A) be a limit point of {z(t)} and let the marginals
(zˆ1, zˆ2) ∈ ∆(A1) × ∆(A2) constitute a Nash equilibrium. By Corollary 1 the maximal
regret converges to zero, so for every i = 1, 2
ui(zˆ) = max
k∈Ai
ui(k, zˆ−i) = ui(zˆi, zˆ−i).
This result illuminates an important difference between no-regret dynamics and discrete
fictitious play. It is well known that under DFP, if the beliefs of the players converge
to a Nash equilibrium, their average realized payoffs need not approach the set of Nash
equilibrium payoffs, whereas under no-regret dynamics it is always the case.
A B C
A 0, 0 1, 0 0, 1
B 0, 1 0, 0 1, 0
C 1, 0 0, 1 0, 0
Fig. 4
(e) Consider the 3× 3 game of Fig. 4 due to Shapley [45], the historical counterexample
to the convergence of fictitious play. This game has a unique equilibrium, in which
both players randomize uniformly. Though this equilibrium attracts some solutions of
continuous fictitious play (e.g. all those that start and remain symmetric), almost all
solutions converge to a hexagon, the so-called Shapley polygon [23, 45, 46]. It may
be shown that the only ICT sets are the Nash equilibrium and the Shapley polygon.
Consequently, the limit set of any no-regret dynamics in class R is almost surely one of
these two sets.
(f) In a number of classes of games, convergence of discrete fictitious play to the set of
Nash equilibria has been established, but analogous results for continuous fictitious play
dominated but has a positive marginal probability under some correlated actions in the Hannan set.
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are lacking. Thus we cannot use Theorem 1. These classes of games include generic 2×n
games [7], generic ordinal potential games, quasi-supermodular games12 with diminishing
returns [8], and some other special classes (see, e.g., Sparrow et al. [46, p. 260]). For ordi-
nal potential games and quasi-supermodular games with diminishing returns, Berger [8]
proves convergence to the set of Nash equilibria of some solutions of continuous fictitious
play as defined by (4) (see our footnote 6). This is not enough to apply the results of
Bena¨ım et al. [5]. The same problem arises in Krishna and Sjo¨stro¨m [36]. Actually, as
explained below, convergence of CFP to the set of Nash equilibria would not suffice to
use Theorem 1: we would need some additional structure, such as a Lyapunov function,
to get more information on the ICT sets.
(g) Consider a bimatrix game in which all solutions of CFP converge to the set of Nash
equilibria. Because the definition of attractor requires uniform attraction, this does not
imply that the set of Nash equilibria is an attractor. Neither does it imply that all ICT
sets are contained in the set of Nash equilibria, as shown in Appendix A.2. Therefore, we
cannot deduce from Theorem 1 that no-regret dynamics in class R converge to the set of
Nash equilibria; whether this is always the case remains an open question.
(h) We show in Section 5 that Theorem 1 also applies, and under weaker assumptions,
to the continuous-time version and to the expected version of no-regret dynamics in class
R. As apparent from the proof, the existence of a potential is not essential: for a good
choice of behavior when there are no regrets, Theorem 1 holds for any no-regret dynamics
such that a player always chooses an action with positive regret whenever he has one.
It also applies to certain no-regret dynamics that do not have this property, such as the
exponential weight algorithm (see Remark 6 at the end of Appendix A.1).
(i) Let us now comment on extensions of our results to n-player games. The definition of
no-regret dynamics, as well as Proposition 1, extend to the n-player setting straightfor-
wardly (e.g., Hart and Mas-Colell [27]). The appropriate extension of CFP is correlated
CFP where at each time t every player chooses a best reply action to the correlated past av-
erage play of the others. Specifically, an absolutely continuous function z : [1,∞)→ ∆(A)
is a solution of correlated CFP if it is almost everywhere differentiable and satisfies
z˙(t) ∈ 1
t
(BR(z(t))− z(t)),
where the correlated best-reply correspondence BR : ∆(A)⇒ ∆(A) is defined byBR(z) =
12Also known as games of strategic complementarities (e.g., Tirole [48]).
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×ni=1BRi(z−i) where BRi(z−i) is the set of mixed best replies of player i to the correlated
action z−i ∈ ∆(A−i).
In n-player games with linear incentives [44], also known as polymatrix games [50], the
correlated and independent best-reply correspondences coincide; that is, for any correlated
action z ∈ ∆(A), BR(z) = BR((z1, .., zn)) where (z1, ..., zn) is the vector of marginals of z,
and BR the standard (independent) best-reply correspondence. For such games, Theorem
1 extends easily. However, this is not the case in general. The main problem is that the
correlated best reply correspondence is not convex valued; that is, BR(z) is not in general
a convex subset of ∆(A).13 This creates two issues:
(i) Existence of solutions of correlated CFP is not guaranteed by the classical results
on differential inclusions we are aware of (e.g., Aubin and Celina [1]).
(ii) The theory of perturbed differential inclusions [5] does not apply to non-convex
valued correspondences.
The first issue can be solved by building piecewise linear solutions of correlated CFP
following the same ideas as for two-player games (see Hofbauer [29]).14 Moreover, due to
Remark 3, Proposition 2 extends to the n-player setting. It then asserts that correlated
CFP leads to no regrets. Lemma 1 also extends: it asserts that if the maximal regret of
player i is less than ε, then she plays only ε-best reply actions to the correlated average
play of the opponents. It follows that, analogously to two-player games, interpolated
trajectories of no-regret dynamics are almost surely perturbed solutions of correlated
CFP. However, we cannot proceed to an analog of Theorem 1 because of the second issue.
Thus, whether there is a formal relation between no-regret dynamics and correlated CFP
in n-player games remains an open question. Similarly, the results of Hofbauer et al. [33]
on the links between the time-average of the replicator dynamics and CFP are restricted
to bimatrix games (or games with linear incentives).
13This is due to the fact that elements of BR(z) are independent distributions and that the average of
two independent distributions need not be an independent distribution.
14Assuming that z(t) is well defined, call Gr(t) the game in which the players are reduced to their best-
replies to z(t). Start with some initial condition z(t0). Then point to a Nash equilibrium of Gr(t0) (i.e.
fix b ∈ NE(Gr(T0)) and choose q(t) = b) till the first time, t1, when, for some player i, a strategy which
was not a best-reply to z(t0) is a best-reply to z(t1). Then iterate. If the times tn accumulate towards
some time t∗, then use the fact that z(t) must have a limit when t → t∗ (because z(t) is Lipschitz).
Call it z(t∗) and restart from z(t∗). Note that there might in principle be a countable infinity of such
accumulation points t∗, and that they might themselves accumulate in some point t∗∗, but then define
z∗∗ as before and restart from there, etc. The largest (forward time) interval on which such a solution
can be built is both open and closed in [t0,+∞) and is thus equal to [t0,+∞).
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4 Curb sets
Theorem 1 does not answer whether attracting sets of CFP have an analogous property
under no-regret dynamics.
A set C ⊂ ∆(A) is eventually attracting under a no-regret dynamic process if with any
given probability it captures all no-regret trajectories originating from a small enough
neighborhood of C at all distant enough periods. Formally, C is eventually attracting if
for every pi > 0 there exists ε > 0 and a period T such that: for every t0 ≥ T , if z(t0) is
in an ε-neighborhood of C, then z(t) converges to set C with probability at least 1− pi.15
For this section it is convenient to replace assumption (Q2) by the following one:
If a player’s maximal regret is nonpositive, then she plays a best-reply
to the empirical distribution of her opponent.
(Q2′)
This is not essential, since the interesting histories are those where both players have
positive regrets, in which case (Q2) plays no role.16
A strict Nash equilibrium is eventually attracting. Indeed, if z(t0) is close enough to
a vertex of ∆(A) corresponding to a strict Nash equilibrium a = (a1, a2), then for each
player i, action ai is the unique best reply and there is a negative regret for any action
other than ai. Since by (R3) only actions with positive regret can be chosen, and by
(Q2′) only best-reply actions can be chosen if all regrets are nonpositive, action ai will be
played by each player i in the following period, and so on.
Let us now consider a standard generalization of strict Nash equilibria. For each
i = 1, 2, let Bi ⊂ Ai. With a slight abuse of notation, denote by ∆(Bi) the set of
probability measures on Ai with support on Bi only. The product set B = B1 × B2 is
closed under rational behavior (curb) (Basu and Weibull [3]) if
BRi(x−i) ⊂ ∆(Bi) whenever x−i ∈ ∆(B−i), i = 1, 2.
That is, the set B is curb if the players’ pure best reply profiles are contained in B
whenever they believe that no actions outside of B should be played.
Curb sets are known to be attracting under CFP (e.g., Balkenborg et al. [2, Lemma
15We say that z(t) converges to C if infc∈C ||z(t)− c|| → 0 as t→∞.
16Recall that by Remark 1, if a player has positive maximal regret, then it remains positive forever. So
we can consider histories from a distant enough period t0 where both players have positive regrets and
(Q2) plays no role. If t0 does not exist, i.e., some player always has nonpositive maximal regret, then
Proposition 1 and (Q2) imply that her play is constant, whereas her opponent’s play must approach a
best reply to it, leading to Nash equilibrium. By replacing (Q2) by (Q2′) we avoid dealing with this issue.
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7]). However, they need not be attracting under no-regret dynamics in class R. Indeed,
even if the support of z(t0) is contained in some curb set B, there may be positive regrets
for actions outside of B, since B need not be closed under better replies. However, we
show that the intersection of the Hannan set and the set of correlated actions with support
on a curb set is eventually attracting.
Formally, let B = B1 × B2 be a curb set. Let ∆B(A) denote the set of correlated
actions with support on B only. Let HB = H ∩∆B(A).
Proposition 3. For every curb set B, the set HB is eventually attracting under every
no-regret dynamics in R.
The proof is based on the following observations. For every curb set B, if the average
play is close enough to HB, then regrets for all actions outside of B are negative (since
B is curb). Hence, by condition (R3), only actions in B will be played in the immediate
future. On the other hand, almost sure convergence of maximum regret to zero suggests
that, so long as the players choose only actions in B, the average play will approach HB,
thus reinforcing the former observation. To prove the result, however, we need to establish
bounds on the maximal future regret conditional on certain histories (namely, conditional
on being close to HB) that Hart and Mas-Colell [27] do not provide. The complete proof
is relegated to Appendix A.3.
5 Continuous-time and expected no-regret dynamics
We now prove an analog of Theorem 1 for continuous-time dynamics [28] and the expected
version of discrete-time dynamics. Both describe trajectories of average intended (mixed)
play, rather than average realized (pure) play. For this reason, condition (R3) is not
needed. Indeed, the interest of (R3) is that, together with (Q1), it requires every realized
action to be a better reply to the opponents empirical distribution of play (whenever such
actions exist). But now we only need every mixed (expected) action to be a better reply,
and this follows already from conditions (R1)-(R2) and (Q1). Besides, these dynamics
are deterministic, hence the results we obtain hold surely (not just almost surely). The
proofs are based on Appendix A.1 and are best understood after reading it.
Consider a continuous-time dynamics
z˙(t) =
1
t
(q¯(t)− z(t)) (6)
where q¯(t) = q1(t) ⊗ q2(t) ∈ ∆(A) is the (independent) joint play at time t and z(t) the
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average correlated play. There are two differences with (1): time is now continuous, and,
more importantly, realized play a(t) has been replaced by intended mixed play q¯(t). As
in CFP, start at time 1 with some initial condition z(1) ∈ ∆(A). Assume that whenever
Ri,max(t) > 0
qi,k(t) =
∇kPi(Ri(t))∑
s∈Ai ∇sPi(Ri(t))
, k ∈ Ai (7)
where Pi is a C
1 potential function satisfying (R1), (R2) and the technical condition:
(P4′) There exists 0 < ρ2 <∞ such that ∇Pi(x) · x ≤ ρ2Pi(x) for all x ∈ RAi− .
This is a part of condition (P4) in Hart and Mas-Colell [28].
Proposition 4. Let z(t) be a solution of (6) and (7) with Pi satisfying conditions (R1),
(R2) and (P4′) for all i = 1, 2. Assume that the initial condition z(1) is such that both
players have some positive regrets: Ri,max(1) > 0 for all i = 1, 2. Then the limit set of the
beliefs is internally chain transitive for continuous fictitious play.
Proof. Let εi(t) := Ri,max(t). Hart and Mas-Colell [28, Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.3
17]
show that if εi(1) > 0, then εi(t) > 0 for all t, and εi(t) → 0 as t → +∞. Moreover, by
(R2) applied to x = Ri(t) and definition of qi, we have: ui(qi, z−i)−ui(z) = qi ·Ri > 0 (this
is equation (3.3) in [27]). Thus by Lemma 1, qi ∈ BRεi(t)i (z−i). Together with Lemma
3 in Appendix A.1, this implies that (z1(·), z2(·)) is a perturbed solution of CFP in the
sense of Bena¨ım et al. [5]. The result then follows from Theorem 3.6 of Bena¨ım et al. [5].
Remark 5. Assume that if all initial regrets of a player are nonpositive then the dynamics
is defined as in Hart and Mas-Colell [28], equation (4.9). Then it is easily seen that the
result of Proposition 4 holds for any initial condition z(1).
Expected discrete-time dynamics. The expected motion in (1) is described by
z(t)− z(t− 1) = 1
t
(q¯(t)− z(t− 1)) .
where q¯(t) = q1(t) ⊗ q2(t) is the expectation of a(t). Assume that qi is derived by (Q1)
from a potential function satisfying (R1)–(R2). Let εi(t) := Ri,max(t). It is easily seen
that, as for continuous-time dynamics, εi(t) → 0 as t → +∞, and if εi(1) > 0, then for
all t, εi(t) > 0 and qi ∈ BRεi(t)i (z−i). Due to Lemmata 3 to 5 of Appendix A.1 and to
17Note a typo in the proof of Lemma 3.3 in Hart and Mas-Colell [28]: (P3) should be replaced by (P4).
Moreover, only our condition (P4′) is used in the proof of Lemma 3.3 in [28].
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Theorem 3.6 of Bena¨ım et al. [5], it follows that for a good choice of behavior when all
regrets are initially nonpositive, the limit set of the beliefs is internally chain transitive
for CFP.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Denote by B̂Rεi (x) the correspondence whose graph is the ε-neighborhood of the graph
of BRi:
B̂Rεi (x−i) =
{
xi ∈ ∆(Ai)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃(x∗i , x∗−i) ∈ ∆(A1)×∆(A2) s.t.x∗i ∈ BRi(x∗−i), and ||(x∗i , x∗−i)− (xi, x−i)||∞ ≤ ε
}
Let B̂Rε(x) = B̂Rε1(x2)× B̂Rε2(x1). In words, action xi is an ε-graph perturbed best reply
to x−i if there is an action ε-close to xi which is an exact best-reply to an action ε-close
to x−i. This is the notion of perturbation used in the theory of perturbed differential
inclusions (Bena¨ım et al. [5, 6]). As illustrated by the example below, it is different from
the notion of perturbation of payoffs in the ε-best reply correspondence, i.e. BRε(x) =
BRε1(x2)×BRε2(x1) with
BRεi (x−i) =
{
xi ∈ ∆(Ai)
∣∣∣ ui(xi, x−i) ≥ max
k∈Ai
ui(k, x−i)− ε
}
, i = 1, 2.
L R
T 1 0
C 0 1
B 1
2
− η 1
2
− η
Fig. 5
Consider a game where the payoffs of player 1 are given by Fig 5. Let ε ∈ (0, 1/2)
and let xε2 =
(
1
2
+ ε
)
L +
(
1
2
− ε)R. The pure action C is a 2ε-best reply to xε2. Using
the sup norm, it is at distance 1 from pure action T , the unique exact best reply to xε2.
Nevertheless, C is an ε-graph perturbed best reply, because it is an exact best reply to x02,
which is ε-close (in sup norm) to xε2. By contrast, for all η > 0, action B is an (ε+η)-best
reply, but only a 1-graph perturbed best reply to xε2.
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A discrete-time trajectory (x1(t), x2(t))
∞
t=1 on ∆(A1) × ∆(A2) is a payoff perturbed
fictitious play trajectory if there exists a positive sequence (εt) converging to zero such
that
x(t)− x(t− 1) = 1
t
(q(t)− x(t− 1))
with q(t) = (q1(t), q2(t)) and qi(t) ∈ BRεti (x−i(t − 1)) for all i = 1, 2 and all t > 1.
It is a graph perturbed fictitious play trajectory if the same holds but replacing BRεti
with B̂Rεti . A trajectory (z(t))
∞
t=1 on ∆(A) generates a sequence of beliefs (z1(t), z2(t)) in
∆(A1)×∆(A2) .
The proof goes as follows. Lemma 2 shows that the sequence of beliefs generated
by a no-regret dynamics is a payoff perturbed FP trajectory. Together with Lemma 3,
this implies that it is a graph-perturbed FP trajectory (Lemma 4). It follows that the
interpolated process of a no-regret dynamics trajectory is a perturbed solution of CFP
(Lemma 5). The result then follows from Bena¨ım et al. [5].
Lemma 2. The sequence of beliefs of a solution of a no-regret dynamics in class R is
almost surely a payoff perturbed DFP trajectory.
Proof. If Ri,max(t) ≤ 0 for all t, then by Remark 2, player i plays an ε(t)-best reply for
some ε(t) converging to zero. Otherwise, Ri,max(t0) > 0 for some t0 ∈ N∗. Then for all
times t > t0, Ri,max(t) > 0 (by Remark 1) and player i plays an Ri,max(t)-best reply by
Lemma 1 and conditions (R3) and (Q1). Since Ri,max(t) → 0 almost surely, the result
follows.
Lemma 3. Let X be a compact subset of Rm and F a correspondence from X to itself. For
any δ ≥ 0, let Fˆδ : X ⇒ X denote the correspondence whose graph is the δ-neighborhood
of the graph of F :
Fˆδ(x) =
{
y ∈ X
∣∣∣ ∃(x∗, y∗) ∈ X2 s.t. y∗ ∈ F (x∗) and ||(x∗, y∗)− (x, y)||∞ ≤ δ}.
For any α > 0, let Gα be an u.s.c. correspondence from X to itself. Assume that for each
x in X:
(i) α < α′ ⇒ Gα(x) ⊂ Gα′(x) (that is, (Gα)α>0 is increasing w.r.t. inclusion);
(ii)
⋂
α>0Gα(x) ⊂ F (x).
Then for every δ > 0 there exists α > 0 such that for each x in X, Gα(x) ⊂ Fˆδ(x).
Proof. By contradiction, assume that there exists δ > 0, a decreasing sequence (αn) con-
verging to zero, and sequences (xn) and (yn) of points inX such that yn ∈ Gαn(xn)\Fˆδ(xn)
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for all n. By compactness of X , we can assume that (xn) and (yn) converge respectively
to x∗ and y∗. Fix k ∈ N. For all n ≥ k, yn ∈ Gαn(xn) ⊂ Gαk(xn) by (i). Since Gαk is
u.s.c., it follows that y∗ ∈ Gαk(x∗). Therefore, by (i) and (ii)
y∗ ∈
⋂
k∈N
Gαk(x
∗) =
⋂
α>0
Gα(x
∗) ⊂ F (x∗)
But for n large enough, ||(x∗, y∗)− (xn, yn)||∞ < δ, hence yn ∈ Fˆδ(xn), a contradiction.
Applied to the best-reply correspondence, Lemma 3 implies that for any δ > 0, an ε-
perturbed best-reply is a δ-graph perturbed best-reply, provided ε is small enough. Thus
we have the next result.
Lemma 4. Any payoff perturbed DFP trajectory is a graph perturbed DFP trajectory.
Proof. Let εt → 0. Let
δt = min
{
δ ≥ 0
∣∣∣ ∀i = 1, 2, ∀x ∈ ∆(A1)×∆(A2), BRεti (x−i) ⊂ B̂Rδi (x−i)} .
Applying Lemma 3 with X = ∆(A1) ×∆(A2), Gε = BRε and F = BR, we obtain that
δt → 0. The result follows.
Given a discrete-time trajectory x(n) = (x1(n), x2(n)) on ∆(A1) × ∆(A2), with n ∈
N
∗, define its interpolated process x : [1,+∞) → ∆(A1) × ∆(A2) as follows. For all
t ∈ [n, n + 1) let tx(t) = nx(n) + (t − n)q(n), where qi(n) = (n + 1)xi(n + 1) − nxi(n),
i = 1, 2. This is equivalent to
xi(t)− xi(n) = t− n
t
(qi(n)− xi(t)), i = 1, 2.
Hence for all t ∈ (n, n + 1) we have ||x(t)− x(n)||∞ ≤ 1n+1 and
x˙(t) =
1
t
(q(n)− x(t)) (8)
An absolutely continuous function x : [1,+∞)→ ∆(A1)×∆(A2) is a perturbed solution
of CFP if there exists a vanishing function ε : R+ → R+ such that for almost all t,
x˙ ∈ 1
t
(
B̂Rε(t)(x)− x
)
where x = x(t). (9)
Lemma 5. The interpolated process of a graph perturbed DFP trajectory is a perturbed
solution of CFP.
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Proof. Consider a discrete time trajectory (x1(n), x2(n))n∈N such that
xi(n)− xi(n− 1) = 1
n
(qi(n)− xi(n)) , i = 1, 2,
with qi(n) ∈ B̂Rεni (x−i(n − 1)) and εn → 0. For all n and all t ∈ [n, n + 1), let ε(t) =
εn+2/n. Obviously, ε(t)→ 0 as t→∞. Moreover, for all t ∈ (n, n+1), the interpolated
process satisfies ||x−i(t) − x−i(n − 1)||∞ ≤ 1n+1 + 1n < 2/n, so qi(n) ∈ B̂R
ε(t)
i (x−i(t)).
Therefore (8) implies (9) (see also Faure and Roth [18, Proposition 2.2]).
We can now prove Theorem 1. By Lemmata 2 and 4, the sequence of beliefs of a
solution of a no-regret dynamics in class R is almost surely a graph perturbed DFP
trajectory. Hence, by Lemma 5, its interpolated process x(t) is a perturbed solution
of CFP. This implies that x(et) is almost surely a perturbed solution of the best-reply
dynamics, in the sense of Bena¨ım et al. [5, Definition II]. Theorem 1 now follows from
Theorem 3.6 of Bena¨ım et al. [5].18
Remark 6. Assume that at stage t, for each i = 1, 2, player i chooses a pure action
according to a mixed action qi(t) that depends on the previous history h(t − 1). Do not
assume conditions (R1)–(R3) and (Q1), but assume that there exists a vanishing sequence
(εt) such that for for all t > 1 and any previous history h(t− 1), qi(t) ∈ BRεti (z−i(t− 1)),
i = 1, 2. Then it follows from Lemma 3, the above proof and Bena¨ım et al. [5, Proposition
1.4 and a variant of Proposition 1.3] that Theorem 1 applies. As is well known, this is
the case for the exponential weights algorithm [21, 39] that corresponds to
qi,k(t) :=
exp βtui(k, z−i)∑
s∈Ai exp(βtui(s, z−i))
with z−i = z−i(t− 1), βt → +∞ as t→∞, and βt < tα for some α ∈ (0, 1) to ensure that
this is a no-regret dynamics (see, e.g., Bena¨ım and Faure [4]). The above assumptions
are not (or not trivially) satisfied by no-regret dynamics in class R. Indeed, the rate at
which the maximal regret vanishes, hence the value εt such that qi(t) ∈ BRεti (z−i(t)), may
depend on the trajectory.
A.2 ICT sets when all solutions converge to Nash equilibria
The fact that all solutions of the best-reply dynamics converge to the set of Nash equilibria
does not guarantee that ICT sets contain only Nash equilibria. We provide counterexam-
18The definition of perturbed solution in Bena¨ım et al. [5] is different from ours but equivalent.
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ples below.
Example 1 (single-population dynamics). Consider the following symmetric 3×3 game:
A B C
A 0 0 0
B 0 0 0
C −1 0 0
Denote a mixed action by x = (xA, xB, xC). Then (x, x) is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if xA = 0 or xC = 0. It is easily seen that all solutions of the best-reply dynamics
converge to the set of symmetric Nash equilibria. However, the whole state space is ICT.
Indeed, any mixed action x can be connected to any other mixed action y as follows:
starting from x, follow a solution pointing towards the edge xC = 0, then jump on this
edge and follow a solution pointing towards the pure strategy B; once close to B, jump
on the edge xA = 0, and follow a solution pointing towards C; once close to C, make a
small jump to reach a point from which a solution points toward y; follow this solution
and if needed (i.e. if yC = 0), make one more jump to reach y.
This example is also valid for the replicator dynamics and any payoff monotone dynam-
ics in the sense of, e.g., Hofbauer and Weibull [34]. The only difference is that traveling
from A to B and from B to C cannot be done by following solutions of the dynamics but
only through long sequences of jumps. Note also that in an inward cycling Rock-Paper-
Scissors game (see e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund [31], or Weibull [49]), all solutions of the
replicator dynamics converge to one of the four rest points but the whole boundary of the
state space is ICT (for the replicator dynamics).
Example 2 (n-population dynamics). Similarly, in the bimatrix version of example 1, all
solutions of the two-population best-reply dynamics converge to the set of Nash equilibria
but the whole state space is ICT. Again, this is true for all payoff monotone dynamics.
Similar examples can be given for n-population dynamics for any n ≥ 1.
At least for the best-reply dynamics, 2× 2 examples can also be given. Consider, for
instance, the 2× 2 game:
L R
T 0, 0 0, 0
B 0, 0 −1, 0
Denote mixed actions of players 1 and 2 by x = (xT , xB) and y = (yL, yR), respectively.
The set of Nash equilibria is the union of the edges xB = 0 and yR = 0 and all solutions of
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the two-population best-reply dynamics converge to this set. However, the whole triangle
xT + yL ≥ 1 is ICT.
In these examples, a direct analysis shows that all solutions of no-regret dynamics in
class R converge to the set of Nash equilibria. Thus we do not know whether, in general,
convergence of all solutions of CFP to the set of Nash equilibria entails convergence of
no-regret dynamics. The point is that this is not guaranteed by Theorem 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We need some notation. For z ∈ ∆(A) and a ∈ A, let za denote the probability of a under
the correlated action z. Let Uγ(HB) be the neighborhood of HB in which the total weight
on action profiles outside of B and the potential of each player are below γ:
Uγ(HB) =
z ∈ ∆(A)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a/∈B
za < γ, and
Pi(Ri(z)) < γ, i = 1, 2,

where Ri(z) is the regret vector of player i: Ri(z) =
(
ui(s, z−i)− ui(z)
)
s∈Ai.
Let B = B1 × B2 be a curb set. Let
δB = min
i=1,2
min
z−i∈∆(B−i)
{
max
s∈Ai
ui(s, z−i)− max
k∈Ai\Bi
ui(k, z−i)
}
and note that δB > 0, since B is curb. Now, consider a no-regret dynamics in R defined
by potentials Pi, i = 1, 2, with trajectory (z(t))t≥1. Let ρi(γ) be the smallest number such
that for all z ∈ ∆(A)
Pi(z) ≤ γ =⇒ Ri,max(z) ≤ ρi(γ),
and let ρ(γ) = max{ρ1(γ), ρ2(γ)}. Let γB be the solution of
(2U¯ + δB)γB + ρ(γB)− δB = 0 (10)
where U¯ = maxi=1,2maxa∈A |ui(a)| is a payoff bound. Since ρ(γ) is weakly increasing in
γ and ρ(0) = 0, there exists a unique solution γB of (10) and γB > 0.
Consider the following event Et:
Pi(Ri(t+ n)) < γB for each i = 1, 2 and all n ∈ N∗. (Et)
The statement of Proposition 3 is immediate by the following claims and Corollary 1.
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Claim 1. If z(t) ∈ UγB (HB) and event Et holds, then a(t + n) ∈ B for all n ∈ N∗.
Claim 2. For every pi ∈ (0, 1] and every γ ∈ (0, γB) there exists t0 such that for every
t ≥ t0, if z(t) ∈ Uγ(B), then event Et holds with probability at least 1− pi.
For the proof of Claim 1 we need the following lemma.
Lemma 6. For any t, if z(t) ∈ UγB(HB), then a(t + 1) ∈ B.
Proof. Let z ∈ ∆(A). If z is close enough toB, then maxs∈Ai ui(s, z−i)−maxk∈Ai\Bi ui(k, z−i) >
δB/2 for all i = 1, 2. If z is close enough to H , then maxs∈Ai ui(s, z−i) − ui(z) < δB/2.
Thus in the neighborhood of HB, maxk∈Ai\Bi ui(k, z−i) < ui(z) hence Ri,k(z) < 0 for all
k ∈ Ai\Bi. In particular, this holds if z ∈ UγB(HB) (we omit the proof: easy but lengthy).
It follows that if z(t) ∈ UγB (HB), then by conditions (R3) and (Q2′), ai(t + 1) ∈ Bi for
each i = 1, 2.
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose that Et holds and let z(t) ∈ UγB (B). Then a(t+1) ∈ B by
Lemma 6. We proceed by induction. Assume a(t+ 1), . . . , a(t+ n) ∈ B for some n ∈ N∗.
Since z(t) ∈ UγB (B), ∑
a∈A\B
za(t + n) <
∑
a∈A\B
za(t) < γB.
Together with Et, this implies that z(t + n) ∈ UγB(B). Consequently, by Lemma 6,
a(t + n+ 1) ∈ B.
The proof of Claim 2 builds up on the proof of Theorem 2.1 of Hart and Mas-Colell
[27]. It is different though, since we need to find the convergence rate of of the maximal
regret conditional on a given initial history (in particular, on those where the past average
play is close to a curb set), which Hart and Mas-Colell [27] do not provide. So our result
cannot be directly derived from their proof.
For the proof of Claim 2 we need the following lemmata.
Lemma 7. Let x1, x2, . . . be a sequence of real random variables with E[xn|xn−1, . . . , x1] =
0 and V ar[xn] ≤ σ¯2 for all n. Then for every pi > 0 and every m = 1, 2, . . .
Pr
[
max
n>m
∣∣∣∣ 1n∑nk=m+1 xk
∣∣∣∣ ≥ σ¯√mpi
]
≤ pi.
Proof. Ha´jek-Re´nyi inequality (e.g., Bullen [12]) implies
Pr
[
max
m<k≤n
ck |xm+1 + . . .+ xk| ≥ ε
]
≤ 1
ε2
∑n
k=m+1
c2kV ar[xk].
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Using ck = 1/k and V ar[xk] ≤ σ¯2, the right-hand side can be bounded as follows,∑n
k=m+1
c2kV ar[xk] ≤ σ¯2
∑n−m
k=1
1
(m+ k)2
≤ σ¯2 1
m
.
Taking the limit n→∞ yields
Pr
[
max
k>m
1
k
|xm+1 + . . .+ xk| ≥ ε
]
≤ σ¯
2
mε2
.
The result is immediate by substitution pi = σ¯2/(mε2).
Define ξ(1) = Pi(Ri(1)) and for all t = 2, 3, . . .
ξ(t) = tPi(Ri(t))− (t− 1)Pi(Ri(t− 1)). (11)
Lemma 8. ξ(t) is uniformly bounded and E[ξ(t)|h(t− 1)] ≤ C/t holds for some constant
C uniformly for all t.
Proof. Let x0 = Ri(t − 1) and x = Ri(t). Note that Ri(t) = t−1t Ri(t − 1) + 1t ri, where
ri = [ui(k, a−i(t))− ui(a(t))]k∈Ai. Hence
x− x0 = 1
t
(ri − x0). (12)
The regret for an action is bounded by 2U¯ and the difference between two regret terms
by 4U¯ . Thus, in sup norm, ||ri − x0|| ≤ 4U¯ and ||x− x0|| ≤ 4U¯/t.
Since Pi is C
2, there exist constants c, c′ and c′′ such that if ||y|| ≤ 4U¯ ,
||Pi(y)|| ≤ c, ||∇Pi(y) · y|| ≤ c′||y||, and ||y · ∇2Pi(y)y|| ≤ c′′||y||2.
Moreover, ξ(t) = Pi(x0) + t(Pi(x) − Pi(x0)) hence |ξ(t)| ≤ c + tc′||x − x0|| ≤ c + 4U¯c′.
Thus ξ(t) is uniformly bounded.
We now show that E[ξ(t)|h(t − 1)] ≤ C/t for C = 8U¯2c′′. By definition of c′′ and
Taylor-Lagrange theorem,
Pi(x) ≤ Pi(x0) +∇Pi(x0) · (x− x0) + 1
2
c′′||x− x0||2.
Using (12) we get:
Pi(x) ≤ t− 1
t
Pi(x0) +
1
t
(Pi(x0)−∇Pi(x0) · x0) + 1
t
∇Pi(x0) · ri(t) + C
t2
.
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Since Pi is convex and Pi(0) = 0, we have:
Pi(x0)−∇Pi(x0) · x0 = Pi(x0) +∇Pi(x0) · (0− x0) ≤ Pi(0) = 0.
Therefore
Pi(x) ≤ t− 1
t
Pi(x0) +
1
t
∇Pi(x0) · ri + C
t2
,
so that
ξ(t) = tPi(x)− (t− 1)Pi(x0) ≤ ∇Pi(x0) · ri + C
t
.
To prove that E[ξ(t)|h(t− 1)] ≤ C/t, it suffices to show that E[∇Pi(x0) · ri|h(t− 1)] = 0.
To see this, note that E[ri,k|h(t− 1)] = ui(k, a−i(t))− ui(qi(t), a−i(t)) hence
E[qi(t) · ri|h(t− 1)] = qi(t) · E[ri|h(t− 1)] =
∑
k∈Ai
qi,k[ui(k, a−i)− ui(qi, a−i)] = 0.
Since qi(t) is proportional to ∇Pi(x0), the result follows.
Proof of Claim 2. By (11) we have
Pi(Ri(t+ n)) =
1
t+ n
t+n∑
s=t+1
ξ(t) +
t
t + n
Pi(Ri(t))
=
1
t+ n
t+n∑
s=t+1
ζ(s) +
1
t+ n
t+n∑
s=t+1
E[ξ(s)|h(s− 1)] + t
t + n
Pi(Ri(t)),
where ζ(s) = ξ(s)− E[ξ(s)|h(s− 1)]. As we have assumed z(t) ∈ Uγ(B), we have
t
t+ n
Pi(Ri(t)) <
t
t+ n
γ ≤ γ.
Next, by Lemma 8,
1
t+ n
t+n∑
s=t+1
E[ξ(s)|h(s− 1)] ≤ 1
t+ n
t+n∑
s=t+1
C
s
≤ C ln(t + n)− ln t
t + n
.
Maximizing ln(t+n)−ln t
t+n
among all n > 0 yields ln(t+n)−ln t
t+n
≤ (te)−1, hence
1
t+ n
t+n∑
s=t+1
E[ξ(s)|h(s− 1)] ≤ C
te
.
Let σ¯2 be a bound on V ar[ζ(s)] for all s (this bound exists, since by Lemma 8 variables
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ξ(s) are uniformly bounded). Applying Lemma 7, we obtain that for every pi > 0 and
every t,
Pr
[
max
n∈N
∣∣∣∣∣ 1t + n
t+n∑
s=t+1
ζ(s)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ σ¯√tpi/2
]
≤ pi
2
.
Hence with probability at least 1− pi/2 the following holds for all n ∈ N∗,
Pi(Ri(t+ n)) <
√
2σ¯√
tpi
+
C
te
+ γ.
and it holds for both i = 1, 2 simultaneously with probability at least (1− pi/2)2 ≥ 1− pi.
Choosing t0 = t0(pi, γ) so large that
√
2σ¯√
t0pi
+ C
t0e
≤ γB − γ, we obtain that event Et:
Pi(Ri(t+ n)) < γB for each i = 1, 2 and all n ∈ N∗
occurs with probability at least (1− pi/2)2 ≥ 1− pi.
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